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1. Introduction     
In this chapter we explain how we use game theory application in wireless communication 
ad-hoc network. The application of mathematical analysis to the study of wireless 
communication ad hoc networks has met with limited success due to the complexity of 
mobility, traffic models and the dynamic topology. A scenario based UMTS TDD 
opportunistic cellular system with an ad hoc behaviour that operates over UMTS FDD 
licensed cellular network is considered. We describe how ad hoc opportunistic radio can be 
modeled as a game and how we apply game theory based Power Control in ad-hoc 
opportunistic radio 
2. Game theory 
Game theory is a field of applied mathematics that describes and analyzes interactive 
decision situations. It provides analytical tools to predict the outcome of complex 
interactions among rational entities, where rationality demands strict adherence to a 
strategy based on perceived or measured results. The main areas of application of game 
theory are economics, political science, biology and sociology. From the early 1990s, 
engineering and computer science have been added to this list. We limit our discussion to 
non-cooperative models that address the interaction among individual rational decision 
makers. Such models are called “games” and the rational decision makers are referred to as 
“players.” In the most straightforward approach, players select a single action from a set of 
feasible actions. Interaction between the players is represented by the influence that each 
player has on the resulting outcome after all players have selected their actions. Each player 
evaluates the resulting outcome through a payoff or “utility” function representing her 
objectives. 
There are two ways of representing different components (players, actions and payoffs) of a 
game: normal or strategic form, and extensive form. Here we will focus on the normal form 
representation.  
Formally, a normal form of a game G is given by  
 G = { N, A, {ui }}  (1) 
where N={1,2,...,n} is the set of players (decision makers), Ai is the action set for player i, A = 
A1 × A2 ×,...,× An is the Cartesian product of the sets of actions available to each player, and 
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{ui }={u1 ,..., un} is the set of utility functions that each player i ,wishes to maximize, where ui : 
A→ R. For every player i, the utility function is a function of the action chosen by player i, ai  
and the actions chosen by all the players in the game other than player i, denoted as a-i. 
Together, ai and a-i make up the action tuple a. An action tuple is a unique choice of actions 
by each player. From this model, steady-state conditions known as Nash equilibria can be 
identified. Before describing the Nash equilibrium we define the best response of a player as 
an action that maximizes her utility function for a given action tuple of the other players. 
Mathematically, a   is a best response by player i to a-i if 
 a  ∈ {arg  max ui  (ai , a-i )}  (2) 
Nash equilibrium (NE) is an action tuple that corresponds to the mutual best response: for 
each player i, the action selected is a best response to the actions of all others. Equivalently, a 
NE is an action tuple where no individual player can benefit from unilateral deviation. 
Formally, the action tuple  
a* = (a1* , a2*, a3*,  .. ., an*) is a NE if ui (a1*  , a-i*) ≥ (a1*, a-i*)  for all ∀ ai ∈ Ai  and for all ∀ i ∈ N.    (3) 
 
The action tuples corresponding to the Nash equilibria are a consistent prediction of the 
outcome of the game, in the sense that if all players predict that Nash equilibrium will occur 
then no player has any incentive to choose a different strategy. There are issues with using 
the Nash equilibrium as a prediction of likely outcomes (for instance, what happens when 
multiple such equilibria exist?). There are also refinements to the concept of Nash 
equilibrium tailored to certain classes of games. A detailed discussion of these is outside the 
scope of this deliverable. There is no guarantee that a Nash equilibrium, when one exists, 
will correspond to an efficient or desirable outcome for a game (indeed, sometimes the 
opposite is true). Pareto optimality is often used as a measure of the efficiency of an 
outcome. An outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player 
at least as well off while making at least one player better off. 
Mathematically, we can say that an action tuple   
a = (a1, a2, a3,..., an) is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists no other action tuple  
b = (b1, b2, b3,..., bn) such that ui (b) ≥ (a)  for ∀ i ∈ N , and  
for some k ∈ N  u k  (b ) ≥  u k  (a ). 
3. Game theory in wireless communication 
There is a significant amount of work in wired and wireless networking that make use of 
game theory. The strategic situations in wireless networking the players have to agree on 
sharing or providing a common resource in a distributed way, our approach focuses on the 
theory of non-cooperative games.  
Cooperative games require additional signalization or agreements between the decision 
makers and hence a solution based on them might be more difficult to realize. In a non-
cooperative game, there exist a number of decision makers, called players, who have 
potentially conflicting interests. In the wireless networking context, the players are the users 
or network operators controlling their devices. In compliance with the practice of game 
theory, we assume that the players are rational, which means that they try to maximize their 
payoffs (or utilities). This assumption of rationality is often questionable, given, for example, 
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the altruistic behaviour of some animals. Herbert A. Simon was the first one was to question 
this assumption and introduced the notion of bounded rationality . But, we believe that in 
computer networks, most of the interactions can be captured using the concept of 
rationality, with the appropriate adjustment of the payoff function. In order to maximize 
their payoff, the players act according to their strategies. The strategy of a player can be a 
single move or a set of moves during the game. 
We take an intuitive top-down approach in the protocol stack to select the examples in 
wireless networking as follows. Let us first assume that the time is split into time steps and 
each device can make one move in each time step. 
In the first game called the Forwarder’s Dilemma, we assume that there exist two devices as 
players, p1 and p2. Each of them wants to send a packet to his destination, dst1 and dst2 
respectively, in each time step using the other player as a forwarder. We assume that the 
communication between a player and his receiver is possible only if the other player 
forwards the packet. We show the Forwarder’s Dilemma scenario in Figure 1. If player p1 
forwards the packet of p2, it costs player p1 a fixed cost 0 < C << 1, which represents the 
energy and computation spent for the forwarding action. By doing so, he enables the 
communication between p2 and dst2, which gives p2 a benefit of 1. The payoff is the difference 
of the benefit and the cost. We assume that the game is symmetric and the same reasoning 
applies to the forwarding move of player p2. The dilemma is the following: Each player is 
tempted to drop the packet he should forward, as this would save some of his resources; but 
if the other player reasons in the same way, then the packet that the first player wanted to 
send will also be dropped. They could, however, do better by mutually forwarding each 
other’s packet. Hence the dilemma. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The network scenario in the Forwarder’s Dilemma game. 
In the second example, called Joint Packet Forwarding Game, we present a scenario, in which a 
source src wants to send a packet to his destination dst in each time step. To this end, he 
needs both devices p1 and p2 to forward for him. Similarly to the previous example, there is a 
forwarding cost 0 < C << 1 if a player forwards the packet of the sender. If both players 
forward, then they each receive a benefit of 1 (e.g., from the sender or the receiver). We 
show this packet forwarding scenario in Figure 2. 
The third example, called Multiple Access Game, introduces the problem of medium access. 
Suppose that there  are two players p1 and p2 who want to access a shared communication 
channel to send some packets to their receivers re1 and re2. We assume that each player has 
one packet to send in each time step and he can decide to access the channel to transmit it or 
to wait. Furthermore, let us assume that p1, p2, re1 and re2 are in the power range of each  
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Fig. 2. The Joint Packet Forwarding Game. 
other, hence their transmissions mutually interfere. If player p1 transmits his packet, it incurs 
a sending cost of 0 < C << 1. The packet is successfully transmitted if p2 waits in that given 
time step (i.e., he does not transmit), otherwise there is a collision. If there is no collision, 
player p1 gets a benefit of 1 from the successful packet transmission. The framework 
presented by Cagalj et al. in  is a generalized version of the Multiple Access Game. 
In the last example, called the Jamming Game, we assume that player p1 wants to send a 
packet in each time step to a receiver re1. In this example, we assume that the wireless 
medium is split into two channels x and y according to the Frequency Division Multiple 
Access (FDMA) principle. The objective of the malicious player p2 is to prevent player p1 from 
a successful transmission by transmitting on the same channel in the given time step. In 
wireless communication, this is called jamming. Clearly, the objective of p1 is to succeed in 
spite of the presence of p2. Accordingly, he receives a payoff of 1 if the attacker cannot jam 
his transmission and he receives a payoff of -1 if the attacker jams his packet. The payoffs for 
the attacker p2 are the opposite of those of 
player p1. We assume that p1 and re1 are synchronized, which means that re1 can always 
receive the packet, unless it is destroyed by the malicious player p2. Note that we neglect the 
transmission cost C, since it applies to each payoff (i.e., the payoffs would be 1-C and -1-C) 
and does not change the conclusions drawn from this game.  
The Jamming Game models the simplified version of a game-theoretic problem presented by 
Zander .We deliberately chose these examples to represent a wide range of problems over 
different protocol layers (as shown in Figure 3). There are indeed fundamental differences 
between these games as follows. The Forwarder’s Dilemma is a symmetric nonzero-sum game, 
because the players can mutually increase their payoffs by cooperating (i.e., from zero to 1-C). 
The conflict of interest is that they have to provide the packet forwarding service for each 
other. Similarly, the players have to establish the packet forwarding service in the Joint Packet 
Forwarding Game, but they are not in a symmetric situation anymore. The Multiple Access 
Game is also a nonzero-sum game, but the players have to share a common resource, the 
wireless medium, instead of providing it. Finally, the Jamming Game is a zero-sum game 
because the gain of one player represents the loss of the other player. These properties lead to 
different games and hence to different strategic analyses. 
3.1 Cognitive radio 
In information times, the increase of wireless equipments makes the spectrum to be the most 
essential and important resources. Now the wireless networks are regulated by a fixed 
spectrum assignment policy. However, according to  Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), a large portion of the assigned spectrum is used sporadically and geographically, so 
the serious problem is the inefficiency usage. This restriction of the tradition spectrum 
policy necessitates a new technology to exploit the spectrum available opportunities which 
is called—cognitive radio. 
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Fig. 3. The classification of the examples according to protocol layers. 
A “cognitive radio” is a radio that can change its transmitter parameters base on interaction 
with the environment in which it operates . It is characterized by cognitive capability and 
reconfigurability. The cognitive capability refers to the capture and sense of the information 
from the radio environment by monitoring the power and 
capturing the temporal and spatial variations. The reconfigurability enables the radio to be 
dynamically programmed by the radio knowledge representation language (RKRL) to select 
the best spectrum and appropriate operating parameters. Therefore, the cognitive radio can 
enhance the flexibility through the cognitive cycle, which has three main steps: radio-scene 
analysis, channel state estimation and predictive modeling, transmit power control and 
spectrum management . The cognitive cycle is pictured in Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic cognitive cycle 
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Transmit-power control is necessary for the cognitive radio system to broaden the scope of 
its applications and enhance the performance. It would have to operate under two 
limitations on network resources: the interference temperature limit imposed by regulatory 
agencies, and the availability of a limited number of spectrum holes depending on usage. In 
a multiuser cognitive radio environment, all the users operate in a decentralized manner; 
they are characterized by cooperation and competition. In such a case, information theory 
and game theory could be applied to exercise control over the transmit power. 
4. Game theory in wireless ad- hoc opportunistic radios 
Wireless communications play a very important role in military networks and networks for 
crisis management, which are characterised by their ad hoc heterogeneous structure. An 
example of a future network can be seen in Figure 5. This illustrates a range of future 
wireless ad hoc applications. In the heterogeneous ad hoc network, it is difficult to develop 
plans that will cope with every eventuality, particularly hostile threats, due to the 
temporary nature. Thus, dynamic management of such networks represents the ideal 
situation where the new emerging fields of cognitive networking and cognitive radio can 
play a part. Here we assume a cognitive radio ‘is a radio that can change its transmitter 
parameters based on interaction with the environment where it operates’, and additionally 
relevant here is the radio’s ability to look for, and intelligently assign spectrum ‘holes’ on a 
dynamic basis from within primarily assigned spectral allocations. The detecting of   holes 
and the subsequent use of the unoccupied spectrum is referred to as opportunistic use of the 
spectrum. An Opportunistic Radio (OR) is the term used to describe a radio that is capable 
of such operation .We use the opportunistic radio system which was proposed that shares 
the spectrum with an UMTS cellular network. This is motivated by the fact that UMTS radio 
frequency spectrum has become, in a significant number of countries, a very expensive 
commodity, and therefore the opportunistic use of these bands could be one way for the 
owners of the licenses to make extra revenue. 
The OR system exploits the UMTS UL bands, therefore, the victim device is the UMTS base 
station, likely far from the opportunistic radio, whose creates local opportunities. These 
potential opportunities in UMTS FDD UL bands are in line with the interference 
temperature metric proposed by the FCC s Spectrum Policy Task Force. The interference 
temperature model manages interference at the receiver through the interference 
temperature limit, which is represented by the amount of new interference that the receiver 
could tolerate. As long as OR users do not exceed this limit by their transmissions, they can 
use this spectrum band. However, handling interference is the main challenge in CDMA 
networks, therefore, the interference temperature concept should be applied in UMTS 
licensed bands in a very careful way. 
The UMTS is a DS-CDMA system, thus all users transmit the information spreaded over 5 
MHz bandwidth at the same time and therefore users interfere with one another. Figure 6 
shows a typical UMTS FDD paired frequencies. The asymmetric load creates spectrum 
opportunities in UL bands since the interference temperature (amount of new interference 
that the UMTS BS can tolerate) is not reached. 
In order to fully exploit the unused radio resources in UMTS, the OR network should be 
able to detect the vacant channelization codes using a classification technique. Thus the OR 
network could communicate using the remaining spreading codes which are orthogonal to 
the used by the UMTS network. However, classify and identify CDMA’s codes is a very 
computational intensive task for real time applications. 
www.intechopen.com
Game Theory in Wireless Ad- hoc Opportunistic Radios   
 
47 
 
Fig. 5. Ad-hoc future network 
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Fig. 6. UMTS FDD spectrum bands with asymmetric load 
Moreover, synchronization between UMTS UL signals and the OR signals to keep the 
ortogonality between codes will be a difficult problem. Our approach is to fill part of the 
available interference temperature raising the noise level above the original noise floor. This 
rise is caused by the OR network activity, which aggregated signal is considered AWGN 
(e.g CDMA, MC-CDMA, OFDM).We consider a scenario where the regulator allows a 
secondary cellular system over primary cellular networks. Therefore we consider 
opportunistic radios entities as secondary users. The secondary opportunistic radio system 
can use the licensed spectrum provided they do not cause harmful interference to the 
owners of the licensed bands i.e., the cellular operators.Specifically we consider as a primary 
cellular network an UMTS system and as secondary networks an ad hoc network with extra 
sensing features and able to switch its carrier frequency to UMTS FDD frequencies. Figure 7 
illustrates the scenario where an opportunistic radio network operates within an UMTS 
cellular system.  
We consider an ah hoc OR network of M nodes operating overlapped to the UMTS FDD cell. 
The OR network acts as a secondary system that exploit opportunities in UMTS UL bands. 
The OR network has an opportunity management entity which computes the maximum 
allowable transmit power for each OR node in order to not disturb the UMTS BS. 
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Fig. 7. Ad hoc ORs networks operating in a licensed UMTS UL band 
4.1 The opportunities network with ad-hoc topology  
The opportunistic network, showed in Figure 8, will interface with the link level simulator 
through LUTs. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Block diagram of the system level platform 
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The propagation models developed for the UMTS FDD network will be reused, and the 
entire channel losses (slow and fast fading) computed. The outputs will be the parameters 
that usually characterize packet transmissions: Throughput, BLER and Packet Delay. The 
LUT sensing algorithm characterization block contains the cyclostationary detector’s 
performance, i.e. the output detection statistic, d, as a function of the SNR measured at the 
sensing antenna for different observation times [6].The sensing OR-UMTS path loss block 
estimates the path loss between UMTS BS and the OR location through the difference 
between the transmitted power and the estimated power given by cyclostationary detector 
(LUT sensing algorithm characterization block output). The OR traffic generation block 
contains real and non-real time service traffic models. OR QoS block defines the minimum 
data rate, the maximum bit error rate and the maximum transmission delay for each service 
class. The non-interference rule block compute the maximum allowable transmit power 
without disturbing the UMTS BS applying a simple non-interference rule (according to 
policy requirements).In the following, we briefly explain the opportunistic network blocks 
that was designed and implemented, using a C++ design methodology approach. 
First of all, we assume that the OR knows a priori the UMTS carrier frequencies and 
bandwidths, which has been isolated and brought to the baseband. In order to get the 
maximum allowable power for OR communications the OR nodes need to estimate the path 
loss from its location to the UMTS BS, i.e., the victim device. The opportunistic user is 
interested in predefined services which should be available every time. This motivates the 
proposal of defining a set of usable radio front end parameters in order to support the 
demanded services classes under different channel conditions. Basically, at the beginning of 
each time step the opportunistic radio requires certain QoS guarantees including certain 
rate, delay and minimum interference to the primary user (non interference rule policy).  
The opportunistic network has an opportunity management entity which computes the 
maximum allowable transmit power for each opportunistic node in order the aggregated 
interference do not disturb the UMTS BS. The aggregated transmit power allowed to the 
opportunistic network can be computed using a simple non-interference rule 
 
ˆ( ) ( )
10 10 10
1
10log 10 10log 10 10
OR OR BSP k G G Lp k Nth NthK
k
μ+ + − +
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟≤ − − Γ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑   (4) 
Where GOR is the OR antenna gain, GBS is the UMTS BS antenna gain, Lp is the estimated 
path loss between the OR node and the UMTS BS, K is the Number of ORs, performed by a 
sensing algorithm, and Nth is the thermal noise floor. µ is a margin of tolerable extra 
interference that, by a policy decision, the UMTS BS can bear. Finally, Γ is a safety factor to 
compensate shadow fading and sensing s impairments. Notice if the margin of tolerable 
interference μ=0 the OR must be silent. Γ is a safety factor margin (e.g. 6-10 dB) to compensate the 
mismatch between the downlink and uplink shadow fading and others sensing’s impairments. The 
margin of tolerable interference is defined according to policy requirements. 
Employing scheduling algorithms, we can provide a good tradeoff between maximizing 
capacity, satisfying delay constraint, achieving fairness and mitigating interference to the 
primary user. In order to satisfy the individual QoS constraints of the opportunistic radios, 
scheduling algorithms that allow the best user to access the channel based on the individual 
priorities of the opportunistic radios, including interference mitigation, have to be 
considered. The objective of the scheduling rules is to achieve the following goals: 
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• Maximize the capacity; 
• Satisfy the time delay guarantees; 
• Achieve fairness; 
• Minimize the interference caused by the opportunistic radios to the primary user. 
A power control solution is required to maximize the energy efficiency of the opportunistic 
radio network, which operates simultaneously in the same frequency band with an UMTS 
UL system. Power control is only applied to address the non-intrusion to the services of the 
primary users, but not the QoS of the opportunistic users. 
A distributed power control implementation which only uses local information to make a 
control decision is of our particular interest. Note that each opportunistic user only needs to 
know its own received SINR at its designated receiver to update its transmission power. The 
fundamental concept of the interference temperature model is to avoid raising the average 
interference power for some frequency range over some limit. However, if either the current 
interference environment or the transmitted underlay signal is particularly non uniform, the 
maximum interference power could be particularly high. 
Following we are going to explain why we consider Ad-hoc topology for the opportunistic 
radio system in cellular scenario.Mobile ad-hoc network is an autonomous system of mobile 
nodes connected by wireless links; each node operates as an end system and a router for all 
other nodes in the network. Mobile ad-hoc network fits for opportunistic radio because the 
following features: 
Infrastructure 
MANET can operate in the absence of any fixed infrastructure. They offer quick and easy 
network deployment in situations where it is not possible. Nodes in mobile ad-hoc network 
are free to move and organize themselves in an arbitrary fashion. This scenario is fit in the 
Opportunities in UMTS bands which are local and may change with OR nodes movement 
and UMTS terminals activity. 
Dynamic Topologies 
Ad hoc networks have a limited wireless transmission range. The network topology which 
is typically multi-hop may change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable times, and may 
consist of both bidirectional and unidirectional links which fits the typical short range 
opportunities which operate on different links in UMTS UL bands. 
Energy-constrained operation 
Some or all of the nodes in a MANET may rely on batteries or other exhaustible means for 
their energy. For these nodes, the most important system design criteria for optimization of 
energy conservation. This power control mechanisms for energy conversion (power battery) 
also helps to avoid harmful interference with the UMTS BS. 
Reconfiguration 
Mobile ad-hoc networks can turn the dream of getting connected "anywhere and at any 
time" into reality. Typical application examples include a disaster recovery or a military 
operation. As an example, we can imagine a group of peoples with laptops, in a business 
meeting at a place where no network services is present. They can easily network their 
machines by forming an ad-hoc network. In our scenario OR network reconfigure itself, as 
the interference coming from licensed users (PUs) causes some links being dropped. Ad hoc 
multi hop transmission allows decreases the amount of the OR’s transmitted power and 
simultaneously decreases the interference with the UMTS BS. 
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Bandwidth-constrained, variable capacity links 
Wireless links will continue to have significantly lower capacity. In addition, the realized 
throughput of wireless communications after accounting for the effects of multiple access, 
fading, noise, and interference conditions, etc. is often much less than a radio's maximum 
transmission rate This constrained also fit in our scenario where maximum transmission rate 
of ORs is less than the UMTS base station after the effects of multiple access, fading, noise 
and interference conditions. 
Security 
Mobile wireless networks are generally more prone to physical security threats than are 
fixed cable nets.  The increased possibility of eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial-of-service 
attacks should be carefully considered. Existing link security techniques are often applied 
within wireless networks to reduce security threats. As a benefit, the decentralized nature of 
network control in MANETs provides additional robustness against the single points of 
failure of more centralized approaches. By using this property of MANETs, we avoid single 
point failure in ORs. 
4.2 Co-existence analysis of single opportunities Radio link  
We consider the simplest case where a single OR link operates within a UMTS FDD cell. 
Simulations were carried out to compute the coexistence analysis between the OR link and 
the UMTS network. The main parameters used for the simulations are summarized in Table 
1. We consider an omnidirectional cell with a radius of 2000 meters. Each available 
frequency, in a maximum of 12, contains 64 primary user terminals. Each of these primary 
users receives the same power from the UMTS base station (perfect power control). We 
assume the primary users data rate equal to 12.2 kbps (voice call); the Eb/No target for 12.2 
kbps is 9 dB. Thus, and since the UMTS receiver bandwidth is 3840 kHz, the signal to 
interference ratio required for the primary users is sensibly -16 dB. There is (minimum one) 
opportunistic radio in the cell coverage area, which has a transmitted power range from -44 
to 10 dBm. The opportunistic radio duration call is equal to 90 seconds. We furthermore 
consider load characteristics. 
Simulation results for a single UMTS frequency 
In order to calculate Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the interference at UMTS 
BS we consider 64 UMTS licensed UMTS terminals in each cell (with radius equal to R= 2000 
m), as shown in the following Figure 9. The OR receiver gets interference from the PUs 
located in the central UMTS cell and in 6 adjacent cells. The ORs are within an ad-hoc 
network service area (with radius equal to R= 100 m); the OR receiver is 10 m away from the 
OR transmitter. The OR transmitter is constrained by the non-interference rule. 
Based on the capacity’s Shannon formula, the OR’s link capacity that can be achieved 
between two OR nodes is given by: 
 2 _2log 1
OR Tx
Mbps
UMTS
L P
C B
Nth I
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
          
5 MHz
107 dBm
B
Nth
=
= −   (4) 
Where B=5 MHz, L2 is the path loss between the OR_Tx and the OR_Rx, Nth is the average 
thermal noise power and IUMTS is the amount of interference that the UMTS terminals cause 
on the OR_Rx. On the other hand, the total interference at the UMTS BS caused by the OR 
activity can not be higher than the UMTS BS interference limit, -116 dBm. 
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Parameter Name Value 
UMTS system  
Time transmission interval (Tti) 2 ms 
Cell type Omni 
Cell radius 2000 m  
Radio Resource Management   
Nominal bandwidth (W) 5 MHz  
Maximum number of available frequencies (N[max]) 12  
Data rate (Rb) 12.2 kbps  
Eb/No target 9 dB  
SIR target (γ) -16 dB 
Spreading factor 16 
Spectral noise density (No) -174 dBm/Hz 
Step size PC Perf. power ctrl 
Channel Model Urban 
Carrier frequency 2 GHz 
Shadowing standard deviation (σ) 8 dB  
Decorrelation length (D) 50 m  
Channel model ITU vehicular A 
Mobile terminals velocity 30 km/h  
Primary User (PU)  
Number of primary user(s) terminals per cell/frequency (K) 64 
Sensibility/Power received -117 dBm  
UMTS BS antenna gain 16 dBi 
Noise figure 9 dB 
Orthogonally factor 0 
Opportunistic Radio (OR)  
Number of opportunistic radio(s) in the cell coverage area 2 
Maximum/Minimum power transmitted (Po [max/min]) 10/-44 dBm  
Antenna gain 0 dBi 
Duration call 90 s 
 
Table 1. Main parameters used for the simulations 
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Fig. 9. Ad-hoc Single Link scenario 
The following Figure 10 shows the CDF of the interference computed at the UMTS BS due 
the OR network activity. The results show that an 8 Mbps OR’s link capacity is guaranteed 
for approximately 98% of the time without exceeding the UMTS BS interference limit (-116 
dBm). However, this percentage decreases to 60% when an OR link with 32 Mbps is 
established identical in every UMTS cellular system and the frequencies are close enough so 
that the same statistical models apply. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Interference at UMTS BS 
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5. Game theory in opportunitics radio 
A wireless ad hoc network is characterized by a distributed, dynamic, self-organizing 
architecture. Each node in the network is capable of independently adapting its operation 
based on the current environment according to predetermined algorithms and protocols. So, 
we are choosing analytical models to evaluate the performance of ad hoc networks with 
opportunists radio access have been scarce due to the distributed and dynamic nature of 
such networks. Game theory offers a suite of tools that may be used effectively in modeling 
the interaction among independent OR nodes in an ad hoc network. We are choosing 
analytical models to evaluate the performance of ad hoc networks with opportunists radio 
access have been scarce due to the distributed and dynamic nature of such networks. Game 
theory offers a suite of tools that may be used effectively in modeling the interaction among 
independent OR nodes in an ad hoc network. 
For over a decade, game theory has been used as a tool to study different aspects of 
computer and telecommunication networks, primarily as applied to problems in traditional 
wired networks. In the past three to four years there has been renewed interest in 
developing networking games, this time to analyze the performance of wireless ad hoc 
networks (ORs). Since the game theoretic models developed for ad hoc networks focus on 
distributed systems, results and conclusions generalize well as the number of players (ORs) 
is increased. It is also of interest to investigate how selfish behavior by individual nodes 
(ORs) may affect the performance of the UMTS system as a whole.In a game, players (ORs) 
are independent decision makers whose payoffs depend on other players’ (OR) actions. 
Nodes (OR) in an ad hoc network are characterized by the same feature. This similarity 
leads to a strong mapping between traditional game theory components and elements of an 
ad hoc network. Table 2 shows typical components of an ad hoc networking game. Game 
theory can be applied to the modeling of an ad hoc network at the physical layer 
(distributed power control), link layer (medium access control) and network layer (packet 
forwarding). Applications at the transport layer and above exist also, although less 
pervasive in the literature. A question of interest in all those cases is that of how to provide 
the appropriate incentives to discourage selfish behavior. Selfishness is generally 
detrimental to overall network performance; examples include a node’s increasing its power 
without regard for interference it may cause on its neighbors (layer 1), a node’s immediately 
retransmitting a frame in case of collisions without going through a backoff phase (layer 2), 
or a node’s refusing to forward packets for its neighbours (layer 3). 
 
Components of a game Elements of an ad hoc network 
Players Nodes in the network 
Strategy 
Action related to the functionality  
Being studies(e.g. the decision to forward packets or not, the 
setting of power level, the selection of 
waveform/modulation scheme) 
Utility function 
Performance metrics(e.g. throughput, delay, target signal-to 
noise ratio) 
Table 2. Typical mapping of ad hoc network components to a game 
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5.1 Using game theory as power control  
Transmit-power control is necessary for the opportunistic radio system to broaden the scope 
of its applications and enhance the performance. It would have to operate under two 
limitations on network resources: the interference temperature limit imposed by regulatory 
agencies, and the availability of a limited number of spectrum holes depending on usage. In 
a multiuser opportunistic radio (ORs) environment, all the users operate in a decentralized 
manner; they are characterized by cooperation and competition. In such a case,  game theory 
could be applied to exercise control over the transmit power. Distributed power control may 
be adopted by a node (OR). From a physical layer perspective, performance is generally a 
function of the effective signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the node(s) of 
interest. When the nodes in a network respond to changes in perceived SINR by adapting 
their signal, a physical layer interactive decision making process occurs. This signal 
adaptation can occur in the transmit power level and the signaling waveform (modulation, 
frequency, and bandwidth). The exact structure of this adaptation is also impacted by a 
variety of factors not directly controllable at the physical layer, including environmental 
path losses and the processing capabilities of the node(s) of interest. A game theoretic model 
for physical layer adaptations can be formed using the parameters listed in Table 3. 
From Table 2 , the stage game for interactive physical layer adaptations can be modeled as 
 G = { N, { Pj   × Ωj },{uj (P, ω, H ) }  (5) 
 
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning 
N The set of decision making nodes 
in the network;{1,2,…n} 
P The power space (Rn) 
formed from the Cartesian 
product of all Pj 
P =P1× P2×... × Pn 
hij The link gain from node  i  to  j . 
Note this may be the function of 
waveform selected 
p A power profile vector) 
from P formed as p =( 
p1,p2,...pn) 
j
Ω  The set of waveform know 
by node  j. 
j
ω  A waveform chosen by j  
from 
j
Ω  
H 
 
The network link gain matrix. 
12 13 1
21
31
1 2
1
1
1
n
n n
h h h
h
hH
h h
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
A
B
B
B D B
 
 
 
Ω  The waveform space 
formed by the Cartesian 
product of all 
j
Ω . 
Ω =
j N∈× jΩ  
Pj The set of power level available to 
node j. This is presumde to be a 
subset of real number line. 
ω  A waveform profile 
(vector) from Ω   formed as  
ω = 1, 2, ,  ... nω ω ω  
 
j
p  A power level chosen by j  from Pj.  ( ), ,ju p Hω The utility derived by j.  
Table 3. Game theoretic model for  OR ad hoc networks 
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For a general game, each OR node, j, selects a power level, pj, and a waveform, ωj, based on 
its current observations and decision making process. Distributed power control systems 
permit each OR radio to select pj, but restrict Ω j to a singleton set; distributed waveform 
adaptation systems (interference avoidance) restrict the choice of pj, but allow ωj to be 
chosen by the physical layer. 
Power control, though closely associated with cellular networks and is implemented in OR 
ad hoc network that operated in the same bands that the primary user UMTS system We 
now model the power control algorithm suggested as a normal form game. Note that a 
similar approach can be followed to model the other distributed algorithms as games, with 
each game involving a different utility function. We adopt the notation in Table 3.For most 
game models, the game theoretic  equivalent of a distributed algorithm’s steady state is a 
Nash equilibrium (NE). An action vector (or alternative vector) a is said to be a NE if equation 
(1) is satisfied. 
 ui (a) ≥ ui (bi , a -i) ∀ i ∈ N, bi ∈ N  (6) 
Consider a DS-CDMA system  with a centralized receiver where all OR nodes other than the 
centralized receiver are adjusting their transmitted power levels in an attempt to maximize 
their signal-to interference- plus-noise ratio (SINR) as measured at the receiver. Here our set 
of players are the OR nodes (other than the centralized receiver); the action sets are the 
available power levels (presumably a finite number of power levels) all OR player’s utility 
functions are given by equation (7) 
 
\
(p)  / ((1/K) )i i k k
j N i
u h p h pi σ∈
= +∑   (7) 
where pi is the transmitted power of node i, K is the statistical estimate of the spreading 
factor, hi is the gain from a node to the receiver, and σ is the noise at the receiver.  
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Fig. 11. 3 OR node closer to the UMTS system 
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As would be indicated by intuition, the unique Nash equilibrium for this game is the power 
vector where all OR nodes transmit at maximum power. This is an undesirable outcome as 
(6) capacity is greatly diminished  due to near-far problems (unless the nodes are all at the 
same radius from the receiver as shown in the Figure 11 and Figure 12 where OR node are 
closer and far away from the UMTS system),  equation  (2) the resulting SINRs are unfairly 
distributed  (the closest node will have a far superior SINR(as shown in the  Figure 11) to the 
furthest node(as shown in the Figure 11 and (12) battery life would be greatly shortened. 
However, this outcome is Pareto optimal as any more equitable power allocation will reduce 
the utility of the closest node, and any less equitable allocation will reduce the utility of the 
disadvantaged nodes. In this scenario Pareto optimality actually misleads the analyst with 
respect to the desirability of the outcome. 
 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
-20
-10
0
10
iteration
U
lit
iy
 F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
 V
a
lu
e
 
 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
iteration
P
o
w
e
r 
(d
B
m
)
 
 
OR1
OR2
OR3
OR4
OR5
OR1
OR2
OR3
OR4
OR5
 
 
Fig. 12. 5 OR node far away to the UMTS system 
6. Conclusion 
Emerging research in game theory based power control applied to ad hoc opportunist  
networks shows much promise to help understand the complex interactions between OR 
nodes in this highly dynamic and distributed environment. Also, the employment of game 
theory in modeling dynamic situations for opportunist ad hoc networks where OR nodes 
have incomplete information has led to the application of largely unexplored games such as 
games of imperfect monitoring. Ad hoc security using game theory is the future area of 
research in ORs we have considered an ah hoc behavior in the opportunists radio (ORs) and 
suggested that by implementing ah hoc features  in the ORs  will  improve the overall 
performance of  system. 
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